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The decision of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties 
Leather Plc [1994) 1 All ER 53 has, for the first time, authoritatively decided that 
foreseeability is an element of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. For some this has heralded 
the arrival of fault to tort's last bastion of strict liability. This paper examines the concept 
of foreseeability in Rylands v Fletcher liability and suggests that it may have been a part 
of the rule from the beginning. 
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FAULT IN A STRICT LIABILITY TORT 
I INTRODUCTION 
Liability in our legal system is based primarily on fault. Today negligence is the 
primary source of tortious liability. Absolute liability exists only at the whim of the 
legislature and the circumstances in which strict liability may come into play are severely 
restricted. The judiciary has embraced fault theory such that despite strict liability having 
existed at common law for hundreds of years , it is common for modem judges to declare 
that it is for Parliament, not the judiciary, to impose such liability. 1 
For years the rule in Rylands v Fletcher has been regarded as the last bastion of 
strict liability in the law of torts. While fault theory (in the form of foreseeability) was 
seen to overtake nuisance following the decision in the Wagon Mound (No 2),2 the rule 
in Rylands v F/,etcher was generally thought to have remained untouched by elements of 
fault. Thus the decision in of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water will have come as 
something of a shock to many commentators and judges. In this case the House of Lords 
re-established the relationship between nuisance and the rule in Rylands v F/,etcher and 
acknowledged foreseeability as an element of Rylands v Fletcher liability. To some this 
means the end of tortious strict liability. However, it may be that foreseeability is not 
incompatible with the concept of strict liability. This paper examines the role of 
foreseeability in Rylands v F/,etcher liability from the rule's origin in the Exchequer 
Chamber to the House of Lords' decision in Cambridge Water and suggests that 
foreseeability has played an unheralded part in strict liability for many years . 
II THE RULE IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER 
What is today recognised as the rule in Rylands v F/,etcher was formulated by 
Blackbum Jin the Exchequer Chamber:3 
2 
3 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings 
on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischie f if it escapes 
must keep it in at his peril , and , if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all 
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. 
See Lord Goff in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather Plc [ 1994] l All ER 53 , 
76 . 
Oversem Tankship (UK) Lid v Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) [ 19661 
2 All ER 709; [1967] I AC 617 . 
Fletcher v Rylands ( 1866) LR l Ex 265, 279. 
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FAULT IN A STRICT LIABILITY TORT 2 
The House of Lords4 fully endorsed the test propounded by Blackburn J. However Lord 
Cairns, "not in a way that could be considered judicially responsible",5 introduced a 
requirement of 'non-natural user' of land. 
As will be discussed later, it appears that none of the judges deciding this case 
considered themselves to be creating new law. Nonetheless the decisions have led to the 
development of a distinct cause of action that has become known as the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher. The elements of this rule are easily stated: 
• The defendant, in the course of a non-natural use of his/her land; 
• must bring on to his/her land; 
• something likely to do mischief; 
• which escapes; and 
• causes damage. 
However, the application of these elements has proved far from simple in many cases. 
A The Elements of the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
1 Non-natural use 
Commentators variously praise Lord Cairns' introduction of this requirement as 
providing an element of flexibility to the rule6 and condemn it as introducing 
uncertainty.7 
Originally non-natural use was merely an "expression of the fact that the 
defendant has artificially introduced on to the land a new and dangerous agent. "8 Today, 
however, non-natural use is no longer a synonym for artificial. To be non-natural a use 
must be out of the ordinary or unusual rather than simply artificial.9 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Rylands v Fletcher ( 1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
Sir Robin Cooke "The Condition of the Law of Tort" (Society of Public Teachers of Law, 
Frontiers of Liability Seminar, All Souls College, Oxford, 3 July 1993) 14 . 
Dias (e<l) Clerk and Lindsell on Torts ( 16 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1989); Fleming The 
Law of Torts (8 ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1992). 
Fridman Torts (1 ed, Waterlow Publishers, London, 1990). 
FH Newark "Non-natural User and Rylands v Fletcher" ( 196 l) 24 MLR 557, 561. 
Rickards v Lothian [ 19 I 3] AC 263. 
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The classic definition of non-natural use of land is to be found in the judgment of 
Lord Moulton in Ricka.rds v Lothian: 1 0 
It is not every use to which land is put that brings into play that principle [ie Rylands v 
Fletcherl. It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and 
must not merely be the ordinary use of land or such a use as is proper for the general 
benefit of the community. 
Using this as the test courts are able to infuse a certain degree of flexibility into the 
application of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. They are thus, to some extent, able to free 
themselves from precedent and narrow or widen the scope of the rule as befits the 
socioeconornic conditions of the time. 1 1 
2 Must Bring on to Land 
It is not only owners of land that may be liable under the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher. Licensees with the right to use the land may also be liable.12 What is essential 
is that the thing brought on to the land is under the defendant's control. 
3 Something Likely to do Mischief 
This element of the tort has caused a large amount of confusion. Today this 
requirement is generally equated with "dangerous thing" but there appears to be no settled 
test as to what constitutes a "dangerous thing". To some it is a question of fact "having 
regard to the circumstances of the time and place and practice of mankind and will vary 
with the circumstances." 13 To others an object is dangerous in the sense that on escape it 
will do damage.14 What the concept of "dangerous thing" entails is considered in depth 
later in this paper. 
LO 
11 
12 
l 3 
14 
Above n 9, 280. 
Reativ J Lyons & Co Ltd [1947) AC 156, 176. 
See for example Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co [1921J 2 AC 465; 
Charing Cross Electricity Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co [19141 3 KB 772. 
Dias, above n 6. 
Lord Porter in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd, above n 12; Trindale & Cane Law of Torts in 
Australia (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1993). 
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Further confusion has arisen due to the occasional blurring of the "dangerous 
thing" and "non-natural use" distinction. 15 The two questions must be kept separate. 
The bringing of a "dangerous thing" onto land may, or may not, constitute a non-natural 
use. 16 Whatever the status of the use, however, it does not affect the question of 
whether the "thing" is "dangerous", although similar factors may influence the 
determinations. 
4 Escape 
In order to ground liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher there must be an 
escape from land under the control of the defendant to a place outside the defendant's 
control.1 7 It need not, however, be the dangerous thing itself which escapes18 and the 
escape need not be on to the plaintiffs land. 1 9 
5 Damage 
The tort of Rylands v Fletcher is not actionable per se. There must be damage to 
give rise to an action. There is no doubt that damage to land and to personal property 
satisfies the damage requirement, but the position is less clear with respect to personal 
injuries. The English Court of Appeal has held in several cases that the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher applies to personal injuries20 but dicta of Lord MacMillan in Read v J Lyons & 
Co Ltcfl 1 suggests that personal injury is excluded from the rule. Subsequently however, 
Lord MacMillan's suggestion has made little headway in England or in any common law 
jurisdiction.22 
15 
16 
17 
l 8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
See Stallybrass (1929) 3 CU 376, 395-396. 
Lord Porter in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd, above n 11, 17 6. 
Readv J Lyons Co, above n 11, 173-174. This aspect of the decision is considered to have 
"prematurely stunted the development of a general theory of strict liability for ultra-hazardous 
activities" (see Fleming, above n 6, 341; see also Lord Goff in Cambridge Water, above n 1, 
76). 
So in Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (1918) 34 TLR 500, the defendant was liable under the 
rule in Ryl.ands v Fletcher for damage caused by rocks thrown by blasting explosives. 
British Celanese Ltd v AH Hunt Ltd (1969] 2 All ER 1252; Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co [ 1961] 
2 All ER 145. 
Hale v Jennings Bros [ 1938] l All ER 579; Perry v Kendricks Transport Co [1956 I 1 WLR 85. 
Above n 11, 173. 
See Fleming, above n 6, 342; Perry v Kendricks Transport Co, above n 20; Benning v Wong 
( 1969) 122 CLR 249; AldridRe v Van Patter [ 1952] 4 DLR 93. 
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B Remoteness of Damage Under the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
A defendant in a Rylands v Fletcher action, as in any other tort, will not be liable 
ad infinitum. There must be some limit on the extent of liability.23 As will be discussed 
later, there has been much confusion as to the limits of liability under the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher. Blackburn J spoke of "the natural consequences" and "the natural and 
anticipated consequences". Prior to Cambridge Water the courts had tended to shy away 
from authoritatively dealing with this aspect of the rule.24 Commentators toyed with the 
concept of foreseeability. Some suggested that while foreseeability was not an element of 
Rylands v Fletcher liability per se, it could be utilised as the test for remoteness once 
liability has been established.25 Such a distinction, however, appears artificial and 
nonsensical.26 It makes no difference to the outcome of a Rylands v Fletcher action if 
foreseeability is considered an element of the tort itself or simply a test for remoteness. 
To say that particular damage is unforeseeable and therefore not recoverable is simply to 
say that there is no liability for such damage under Rylands v Fletcher. Conceptually it 
may be possible to make a distinction, but in practice foreseeability will determine liability 
in either case. Thus foreseeability is either a part of Rylands v Fletcher liability, or it is 
not. This was the issue that was authoritatively decided for the first time by the House of 
Lords in Cambridge Water. 
III CAMBRIDGE WATER CO LTD V EASTERN COUNTIES 
LEATHER PLC 
Eastern Counties Leather (ECL) was a leather manufacturer that had been in 
business in the village of Sawton since 1879. The Cambridge Water Company (CWC) 
was a statutory water company responsible for providing a public water supply within a 
large area in and around the city of Cambridge. 
In 1976 CWC purchased land 1.3 miles from Sawton for the purpose of 
abstracting water form the underground strata in order to supplement water supplies. A 
pumping station was commissioned on the site in 1979 . 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Winfield Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort ( 13 ed, Sweet & Maxwell , 1989). 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock Engineering Co Ltd (Wagon Mound (No /)) [1961 l 
AC 388, 426-427; British Celanese Ltd v AH Hunt Ltd, above n 19. But see Benning v Wong, 
above n 22. 
Winfield, above o 23, 440. 
The Privy Council rejected just such a distinction in respect of negligence in the Wagon Mound 
(No I), above o 24, 425. 
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Prior to purchase of the land, the water to be extracted was tested for purity and 
found to be "wholesome" in accordance with the then current standards for water quality. 
However, four years later, in l 980, the European Community Council issued a directive 
relating to the quality of water intended for human consumption. In this directive 
organochlorine compounds were, for the first time, considered contaminants of drinking 
water and assigned maximum admissible concentration values. The United Kingdom 
responded in 1982 with legislation setting appropriate maximum levels of organochlorine 
concentrations in drinking water to be enforced by 1985. Further tests on the water at the 
Sawton site in 1983 revealed concentrations of the organochlorine compound 
perchloroethane (PCE) well above the maximum levels set by the new legislation. As 
such the water was "unwholesome" and the pumping station was taken out of 
commission . 
Extensive investigations revealed that the source of the PCE was the premises of 
ECL. ECL had, since the 1960's, utilised PCE as a cleaning and degreasing agent in the 
tanning of hides. The trial Judge found that spillages of PCE had occurred at the ECL 
plant up until 1976 when the method of storage and use of PCE was altered. The 
undisputed evidence of expert witnesses was that PCE so spilled travelled down through 
interstices in the concrete floor of the plant and into the soil below. It continued its 
downward passage through the chalk aquifer until it reached an impermeable strata 50 
metres below the surface. Here it formed pools and slowly moved down the aquifer until 
it reached CWC's extraction plant 1.3 miles away. The whole journey was estimated to 
take about nine months. On the balance of probabilities it was held that this was the 
cause of the PCE contamination at CWC's Sawton borehole . 
CWC then brought actions against ECL in negligence, nuisance and the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher. At trial the evidence showed that PCE was highly volatile and 
evaporated quickly in air. The trial Judge held that the seepage of PCE through the plant 
floor and into the chalk aquifer was not foreseeable by a reasonable supervisor employed 
by ECL. Further, the movement of PCE down-catchment in detectable quantities was 
unforeseeable so that it could not be foreseen, in or before 1976, that the repeated 
spillages would lead to any environmental hazard or damage. 
On the basis of these findings the trial Judge dismissed the actions in negligence 
and nuisance due to lack of foreseeability that the spillages of PCE would result in 
contamination of CWC's bore water. The action under Rylands v Fletcher failed on the 
basis that the storage and use of PCE in the leather tanning industry was a natural use of 
land. 
• 
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In the Court of Appeal CWC pursued only the action under Rylands v Fletcher. 
The Court, however, held ECL liable on the basis of the decision in Ballard v 
Tomlinson. 2 7 That case decided that "where the nuisance is an interference with a natural 
right incident to ownership then the liability is a strict one."28 
The House of Lords disagreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal. 
Ballard v Tomlinson was not authority for the proposition that a defendant could be held 
liable for damage which could not reasonably have been foreseen. In the opinion of the 
House of Lords, Ballardv Tomlinson disclosed no more than that:29 
. .. in the circumstances of the case, the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in tort for the 
contamination of the source of water supplying the plaintiffs well, either on the basis 
of the rnle in Rylands v Fletcher, or under the law of nuisance ... .lt follows that the 
question whether such a liability may attach in any particular case must depend upon the 
principles governing liability under one or other of those two heads of law. 
The claim in nuisance having been abandoned, it fell to the House of Lords to consider 
liability solely under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
Lord Goff, who delivered the judgment of the House, held that there was no 
liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher because foreseeability was an element of the 
rule and it was not satisfied on the facts. In authoritatively stating that foreseeability was 
an element of Rylan,ds v Fletcher liability, Lord Goff was answering a question that 
earlier Courts had scrupulously avoided directly considering. Commentators, however, 
had found the issue a fertile ground for conjecture and comment Some had argued that 
foreseeability was incompatible with Rylands v Fletchers status as a strict liability tort 
while others had claimed that it was an inherent part of the rule. 
In support of his finding that foreseeability was an element of the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher, Lord Goff relied on three points: the historical origins of Rylands v fletcher 
in nuisance; the wording of the original statement of the rule by Blackburn J; and the 
move to restrict the scope of liability under the rule evidenced by the decision of the 
House of Lords in Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd. 30 It is the first two of these factors that 
27 (1885) 29 ChD 115. 
28 Above n l, 61. 
29 Above n 1, 68-69 . 
30 Above n 11. 
111 ,. 
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bear particular relevance to the concept of foreseeability as an element of the rule m 
Rylands v Fletcher. 
IV THE RELATIONSHIP OF RYLANDS v FLETCHER WITH 
NUISANCE 
A The Attitude of the Coun of the Exchequer Chamber 
Blackburn J clearly regarded the facts in Rylands v Fletcher as giving rise to an 
established form of liability:3 1 
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for bis own purposes brings 
on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, 
must keep it in at his peril, and, ifhe does not do so, is primii facie am,werable for all 
the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.... A!zd upon authority, this 
we think is established to be the law whether the thing so brought be beasts, or water, 
or filth, or stenches [ emphasis added]. 
The authority considered by the Court of the Exchequer Chamber to be of most 
weight was TenanJ v Goldwiri3 2 This case involved the escape of filth from the 
defendant's privy into the plaintiffs cellar. The defendant was held liable on the basis of 
the principle that everyone must so use their land as not to do damage to others. Just as 
you are bound to keep your cattle out of your neighbour's land so too must you confine 
your filth so that it will not flow onto your neighbour's property. The Court of the 
Exchequer Chamber in F/etcherv Rylands saw Tennantv Goldwin as:33 
. .. a very weighty authority in support of the position that he who brings and keeps 
anything, no matter whether beast, or filth, or clean water, or a heap of earth or dung, 
on bis premises, must at his peril prevent it from getting on his neighbour's, or make 
good all the damage which is the natural consequence of its doing so. 
It had long been established at common law that owners of cattle must keep them 
confined at their peril. All that Blackburn J appears to have intended in Fletcher v 
Rylands was to follow TenanJ v Goldwin in holding that this strict liability (as we now 
know it) extends to other things brought onto land that might cause mischief on escape. 
31 
32 
33 
Above n 3, 279-280. 
( 1704) 2 Lord Raym 1089; I Salk 21, 360; 6 Mod 3 l l. 
Above n 3, 285. 
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His hono,,ur gives as examples, a cellar invaded by the filth from his neighbour's privy 
and the fumes and noisome vapours of a neighbouring alkali works. These are both 
clearly cases of nuisance and he regarded these as analogous to the case before him.3 4 
Indeed, Bramwell B in the Court below, whose dissenting decision Blackburn J 
endorses,3 5 was of the opinion that there was no reason why the situation before him 
was not a nuisance.36 
The underlying rule in both Tenant v Goldwin and in FI.etcher v Rylands is clearly 
that you must so use your own property as not to injure that of another: sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non lc.edas. This is the very principle underlying the tort of nuisance and was in 
existence well before Rylands v fletcher came before the Court of the Exchequer 
Chamber.37 
That Blackburn J regarded himself as doing no more than stating existing law is 
illustrated by his comments in later cases. In Jones v Festiniog Railway Ca3 8 Blackburn 
J points out that Rylands v fletcher was no more than an enunciation of common law. 
Four years later in the case of Ross v Fedden,39 in response to counsel's claim that the 
point decided in Rylands v fletcher was a new one, Blackburn J replied:40 
I wasted much time in the preparation of the judgment in Rylands v Fletcher if I did not 
succeed in showing that the law held to govern it had been law for at least 300 years. 
Further support for Blackburn J's view that there was no new law involved in the 
decision in Rylands v FI.etcher can be gleaned from a case decided six years earlier than 
Rylands v fletcher. This was the case of Vaughan v Taff Vale Railway Co. 41 
Blackburn J himself sat on this case but the leading judgment was given by Cockburn 
CJ. The case involved damage resulting from the emission of sparks from a steam 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Above n 3, 280. 
Above n 3, 278. 
"Why is it not a nuisance? The nuisance is not in the reservoir, but in the water escaping. As 
in Bonomi v Blackhouse [9 HL Cas 903; 27 Law J Rep (NS) QB 378], the act was lawful, the 
mischievous consequence was a wrong." As per Bramwell J in Fletcher v Rylands ( 1865) 34 
Exch (NS) 177, 182. 
See, for example, Vaughan v Menlove ( 1837) 3 Bing (NC) 468; Tenant v Gold win above n 32. 
(1868) LR 3 QB 733. 
(1872) 26 LT 966. 
Above n 39, 968. 
(1860) 157 ER 1351. 
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locomotive. No negligence was involved as it was accepted by the Court that the 
defendants had taken all possible care to avoid the emission of sparks. The question 
before the Exchequer Chamber was whether, in light of a statute authorising the use of 
such locomotives, the defendants could be liable for the damage in the absence of 
negligence. It is not the decision in this case which is important to this discussion, rather 
it is the apparent assumption by the Court that, in the absence of the statute, the 
defendants would be liable that is of particular interest:42 
Although it may be true, that if a person keeps an animal of known dangerous 
propensities, or a dangerous instrument, he will be responsible to those who are thereby 
injured, independently of any negligence in the mode of dealing with the animal or 
using the instrument...[Cockbum CJ then goes on to demonstrate that the position is 
altered under the statute]. 
This sounds very much like Rylands v Fletcher six years early. Clearly in Rylands v 
Fletcher Blackburn J was applying the common law as the Exchequer Chamber in 
Vaugha.n v Taff Vale Railway Co understood it and the language he uses is reminiscent of 
Cockburn CJ's judgment. It may well be that as a relative newcomer to the bench in 
186043 Blackburn J was influenced by these comments such that when he came to decide 
Rylands v Fletcher he remembered the words of Cockburn CJ. 
On appeal Rylands v Fletcher came before the House of Lords. Lord Cairns and 
Lord Cran worth were in complete agreement with Blackburn J. Lord Cairns considered 
the principles on which the case was decided to be "extremely simple"44 and both saw the 
nuisance cases of Baird v Williamsorf 5 and Smith v Kendrick'+- 6 as providing ample 
authority. Lord Cranworth went even further back into judicial history to show that the 
principle in question had long been recognised.4 7 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Above n 41, 1354; as per Cockburn CJ. 
Blackburn J had been appointed to the bench in June 1859 while Vaughan v Ta.ff Vale Railway 
Co came before the Court of the Exchequer Chamber less than a year later in May 1860. 
Cockburn CJ, in contrast, had been on the bench for more than 10 years at the time this case 
was heard. 
Above n 4, 338. 
(1863) 15 CB (NS) 376; (1863) 143 ER 831. 
(1849) 7 CB 515; (1849) 137 ER 205. 
Lambert and Olliotv Bessey (1681) Sir T Raym 421; (1681) 83 ER 220. 
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B The Attitude ofLa1er Courts 
While the Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords confidently applied a rule 
that they saw as having been in existence for 300 years, subsequent courts and 
commentators have experienced rather more difficulty in viewing Rylanlis v Fletcher as 
stating existing law. Many regarded, and continue to regard, Rylanlis v Fletcher as a 
landmark decision in the law of torts creating a new fonn of liability and a novel rule of 
law. Voices were raised in defence of the "established law" position but they tended to 
be isolated and drowned out by the excitement of discovering the limits of this "new" 
form of liability. 
1 The English courts 
In Rickards v Lothian, Lord Moulton stated that "[tJhe legal principle that 
underlies the decision in Rylanlis v Fletcher .. .is nothing more than an application of the 
old maxim 'sic utere tuo alienum non lredas'."48 In Musgrove v Panlielis4 9 the English 
Court of Appeal expressed its view that "the principle of Rylanlis v Fletcher existed long 
before that case was decided. "5 0 But these sentiments were soon to give way to the 
extent that, in 1921, Lord Buckmaster was able to refer to "the familiar doctrine 
established by the case of Rylands v Fletcher [ emphasis added]. "5 1 
An article published in 1949 by FH Newark,52 suggesting that Rylanlis v Fletcher 
was a simple case of nuisance that had subsequently been misconstrued, was largely 
ignored by the judiciary. Newark considered the main principle involved in Rylanlis v 
Fletcher simply to be that negligence was not an element of nuisance. The only possible 
novelty in the case was that for the first time it was clearly decided that, as between 
adjacent occupiers, an isolated escape might give rise to liability. However, by this time 
Rylanlis v Fletcher was almost universally regarded as a new and distinct tort related to 
nuisance as "intersecting circles, not as the segment of a circle to the circle itself. "5 3 In 
the Privy Council Lord Wright went so far as to say that nuisance and the rule in Rylanlis 
48 
49 
50 
5 l 
52 
53 
Above n 9, 275. 
[1919] 2 KB 43. 
Above n 49, 47; as per Bankes LJ. 
Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Co, above n 12, 47 l. 
"The 80lmdaries of Nuisance" ( 1949) 65 LQR 480. 
PH Winfield "Nuisance as a Tort" (1932) 4 CU 189, 195. 
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v Fletcher were different not only m their incidents and applications but also in their 
historical origins.5 4 
Thus it appears that however the Exchequer Chamber and House of Lords may 
have regarded their decision, it has since "become the name of a separate chapter in the 
law of torts .... The only question is what are its scope and limits. "5 5 
2 The New Zealand courts 
In New Zealand similar confusion as to the ongm of the rule m Rylands v 
Fletcher and its position within the law of torts has beset the judiciary. Hosking J in 
Crisp v Snowsilf5 6 considered Rylands v Fletcher to be an application of the old maxim 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non lcedas, while Salmond Jin Knight v Bolton5 1 was concerned 
with "the rule of absolute liability established by Rylands v Fletcher [emphasis 
· added]. "5 8 In Irvine and Co Ltd v Dunedin City Corporation5 9 the full bench of the 
Court of Appeal made it abundantly clear that in their opinion Rylands v Fletcher was 
merely a form of nuisance. This case involved the escape of water from a pipe under the 
street surface. The water entered the basement of the plaintiffs premises and damaged 
goods therein. Counsel for both parties agreed that the sole question was whether the 
doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher was applicable given that the waterworks system was 
constructed and maintained under statutory authority. Despite this, in the first line of his 
judgment Myers CJ states that the "plaintiffs ac6on is based solely upon nuisance."60 
He then goes on to consider Green v Chelsea Waterworks Cc/J 1 and Charing Cross 
Electricity Supply Co v Hydraulic Power Co62, both cases involving Rylands v Fletcher 
liability, before concluding that "the condition of things in the present case amounted to a 
nuisance. "63 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Northwestern Utilities Ltd v London Guarantee and Accident Co [1935 J AC 108, 119. 
Benning v Wong, above n 22, 297; as per Windeyer J. 
[19171 NZLR 252. 
[1924] NZLR 806 . 
Above n 57, 811. Note that, as Sir Robin Cooke says in "The Condition of the Law of Tort", 
above n 5, 13: "Rylands v Fletcher was never absolute liability because of the act of God and act 
of a stranger defences." 
[ 1939 I NZLR 741. 
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The other members of the Court express similar sentiments. Ostler J states, in 
consecutive paragraphs, first, that the plaintiff company bases its claim entirely upon 
nuisance and then that counsel for the plaintiff contends that the defendant corporation is 
liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 64 Smith J, while discussing Rylands v 
Fletcher liability throughout his judgment, comes to the conclusion that the escape created 
a nuisance. 
Since that time New Zealand courts have followed the international trend and have 
applied Rylands v Fletcher as an independent tort. However they have not forgotten its 
origins. While Hardie Boys Jin AS & AC Chaffey Ltd v HobsorP 5 stated that whether 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher was simply an aspect of nuisance is a debatable question, 
Pritchard J in Geothermal Produce New Zealand Ltd v Goldie Applicators Lu/5 6 was less 
coy stating that "[tlhe rule in Rylands v Fletcher is a development from the law of 
nuisance: liability under the rule will often co-exist with liability under the law of 
nuisance. "6 7 
C The Attitude of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water 
The judgment of the House of Lords in Cambridge Water represents a startling 
judicial about face. Instead of following the general trend of English courts to regard 
Rylands v Fletcher as a separate category of tortious liability, the House of Lords 
expressly adopts Newark's view of the origin of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Lord 
Goff is of the opinion that to regard the rule "essentially as an extension of the law of 
nuisance to cases of isolated escapes from land"68 would lead to a "more coherent body 
of common law principles".69 By acknowledging Rylands v Fletcher's nineteenth 
century nuisance origins the House of Lords are more easily able to bring it into line with 
twentieth century concepts of nuisance. 
V FORESEEABILITY IN RYLANDS V FLETCHER 
The historical connection between Rylands v Fletcher liability and nuisance played 
a large role in persuading Lord Goff that foreseeability was an element of Rylands v 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Above n 59, 768. 
Unreported, 30 September I 988, High Court Christchurch Registry CP l0/87. 
Unreported, 17 February 1983, High Court Rotorua Registry A 26/8 l. 
Above n 66, 34. 
Above n 1, 76. 
Above n 1, 76 . 
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Fletcher liability. Having acknowledged Rylands v Fletcher's nuisance ongrns, Lord 
Goff went on to examine the relevance of foreseeability in nuisance. He saw the recent 
development of the law of negligence as strongly pointing to a requirement that the type 
of harm caused should be a prerequisite for liability in nuisance as it is for negligence. 
There was, in Lord Goff's view, no justification for a plaintiff to be in a stronger position 
with respect to interferences with land than personal injuries. 
A Analogy with Nuisance 
Lord Goff found support for his intuitive position that foreseeability was an 
element of nuisance in the decision of the Privy Council in The Wagon Mouna (No 2). 70 
This case has been generally considered to settle the law to the effect that foreseeability of 
harm is a requirement for liability in all forms of nuisance:71 
It is quite true that negligence is not an essential element in nuisance. Nuisance is a 
term used to cover a wide variety oftortious acts or omissions and in many negligence 
in the narrow sense is not essential. .. although negligence may not be necessary, fault of 
some kind is almost always necessary and fault generally involves foreseeability. 
While the Wagon Mouna (No 2) involved public nuisance, the Privy Council was 
of the opinion that this foreseeability of harm requirement was common to all nuisance 
actions.72 This was confirmed in Hiap lee (Cheong Leong ana Sons) Brickmakers v 
Weng Lok Mining Co Ltrf7 3 where foreseeability was considered a part of private 
nuisance liability.7 4 
1 What must be foreseeable in nuisance? 
In the course of his judgment in the Wagon Mound (No 2) Lord Reid stated that7 5 
"[i]t is not sufficient that the injury suffered by the respondent's vessel was the direct 
result of the nuisance if that injury was in the relevant sense unforeseeable." 
Foreseeability in the relevant sense involved an analysis of whether a reasonable person 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Above n 2. 
Above n 2,717; 639. 
Above n 2,717; 640. 
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"having the knowledge and experience of the chief engineer of the Wagon Mound would 
have known that there was a real risk of the oil on the water catching fire".76 Later 
cases77 have further explained this foreseeability requirement as being foreseeability of 
the type or kind of damage in suit:78 
The present view is that all loss of a kind which could be foreseen is recoverable. 
Provided the loss is of a foreseeable kind, the wrongdoer will be held liable for all of it, 
even though its extent was unforeseeable or it arose in an unforeseeable manner. 
So while the type of damage that occurred must be foreseeable the precise manner 
in which it came about and its extent need not be foreseeable.79 In the Wagon Mound 
(No 2) it was held to be foreseeable that the oil might alight and thus fire damage was a 
foreseeable type of harm for which liability in nuisance could be imposed. The role of 
foreseeability established by the Wagon Mound litigation has been summarised in Koufos 
v C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) 80 to the effect that "the defendant will be liable for 
any type of damage which is reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most 
unusual case .... " 
B Indications of Foreseeability by Blackbum J 
Lord Goff found further support for the introduction of a foreseeability of harm 
requirement to Rylands v Fletcher liability in the judgment of Blackburn J in Fletcher v 
Rylands:81 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
8 l 
Blackburn J spoke of 'anything likely to do mischief if it escapes'; and later he spoke of 
something 'which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on to his neighbour's 
[property]', and the liability to 'answer for the natural a,ul witicipated consequences' .... 
The general tenor of his statement of principle is therefore that knowledge, or at least 
foreseeability of the risk, is a prerequisite of the recovery of damages under the 
principle; but that the principle is one of strict liability in the sense that the defendant 
Above n 2,718; 643. 
Hiap Lee (Cheong Leong and Sons) Brickmakers v Weng Lok Mining Co Ltd, above n 73; 
Geothermal Produce New Zeala,uJ l.Jd v Goldie Applicators l.Jd, above n 67. 
Geothermal Produce New Zeala,ul l.Jd v Goldie Applicators Ltd, above n 67, 85. 
Fleming, above n 6, 211. 
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may be liable notwithstanding that he has exercised all due care to prevent the escape 
from occurring. 
16 
In addition Blackburn J explains the liability for the escape of cattle (a liability he 
regarded as analogous to that applicable in the case before him) as being limited to 
damage which could be expected to result. Thus the owner of the cattle would be 
answerable for the trampling and eating of grass but not for any injury to people as it is 
understood that this is not in the general nature of tame animals. However, "if the owner 
knows that the beast has a vicious propensity to attack man, he will be answerable for 
that too. "8 '.! Thus it appears that Blackburn J did regard foreseeability of the type of harm 
as a prerequisite for liability under the rule that he "established". However, this does not 
necessarily mean that Lord Goff was completely in tune with Blackburn J's intentions. 
We must look to the role intended for foreseeability. 
1 What form of foreseeability did Blackburn J inlend? 
Blackburn J was concerned solely with foreseeability of the type of harm. Thus 
he would impose liability on the escape of cattle for the trampling and eating of grass, but 
not for the kicking or goring of a person unless the animal's propensity for such violence 
was known. 'John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks would clearly have escaped liability if 
foreseeability of the way in which the harm occurred had been a requirement of liability. 
While the flooding of Thomas Fletcher's mine could be said to have been of a type 
foreseeable on the escape of a large body of water (ie flooding) the way in which it 
occurred was completely unforeseeable - the defendants were unaware of the existence of 
the mine shafts through which the water escaped. Thus it could be said that while the 
escape itself was unforeseeable, the type of damage that was suffered was foreseeable. 
Foreseeability of the way in which the harm occurred played no part in Blackburn J's 
judgment. 
Further evidence that Blackburn J's judgment cannot be taken to adopt 
foreseeability of the way in which the harm occurred (ie foreseeability of the escape) 
comes in his suggested defences to liability: act of God and viz major. These defences 
both relate to the foreseeability of the event causing the harm. An act of God is an 
occurrence caused by the forces of nature "which no human foresight can provide 
against, and of which human prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility .... "83 
Similarly with the defence of viz major, if the defendant can show that the cause of the 
82 
83 
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escape and consequent damage was some intervening event, such as the act of a stranger, 
then liability will be avoided unless "the act was of the kind which the defendant could 
reasonably have foreseen and guarded against "84 
If liability under the rule Blackburn J was applying required foreseeability of the 
way in which the harm occurred these defences would clearly be redundant. Where an 
escape and damage was the result of an act of God or viz major the necessary 
foreseeability to ground an action could not be established and the defendant would not 
need to raise a defence at all. This point is illustrated by the case of Nichols v 
Marsland. 85 In that case the defendant had ornamental pools on her property which, due 
to a rainfall of unprecedented proportions, flooded and damaged a neighbouring 
property. The defendant escaped liability under the rule in Rylands v FI.etcher on the 
ground that the rainfall was so unusual as to be an act of God. If foreseeability of the 
way in which the harm occurred was an element of Rylands v FI.etcher liability, the issue 
of whether the rainfall constituted an act of God would have added nothing to the inquiry. 
Once it was established that the rainfall was unforeseeable liability would be negated and 
its categorisation as an act of God would not be relevant. 
C How has Foreseeability in the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher Been Seen Since? 
Once again, despite Blackburn J being very clear as to an aspect of the rule he was 
applying, subsequently the position became highly confused. Part of the problem sprang 
from the concept that Rylands v FI.etcher was a new strict liability tort and thus no hint of 
fault theory could be seen to impinge upon it. However, as is pointed out by Salmond 
and Heuston86 a concept of foreseeability is not necessarily incompatible with strict 
liability. Even if the type of harm must be foreseeable, liability may still be strict in the 
sense that it will not avail the defendants to claim that they did all they could to avoid the 
harm. 
The concept of 'dangerous thing'87 would appear to be a vehicle for this 
foreseeability requirement. The approach of the English common law has largely been to 
84 
85 
86 
87 
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deal with the foreseeability of the thing being dangerous on escap~ 8. Lord Porter in 
Rea.d v J Lyons & Co Ltd6 9 stated that an object could be classified as being dangerous in 
the sense that if it escapes it will do damage. Similarly in Mulholland & Teda Ltd v 
Baker90 Asquith J spoke of "an object likely to do damage if it is not kept under 
control. •'9 1 Many of the major text writers agree with this approach;92 however, there 
has been some confusion. 
Clerk and Lindsell, for example, agree that the test is "that they are things likely to 
do damage if they escape"93 but then go on to warn that "it is necessary to keep in mind 
the essential feature of the rule that it is applicable where no harm at all is reasonably 
foreseeable. "9 4 Fleming, while eschewing foreseeability as an element of the rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher, proposes that the harm done "must result from a risk which called for 
the imposition of strict liability. "9 5 But surely this is nothing more than requiring that the 
type of harm be foreseeable. Fridman provides a more pragmatic approach when he 
says:96 
88 
89 
90 
9 l 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Yet the operation of the rule does not depend upon what is foreseeable by the reasonable 
man, or preventable. It seems to depend more upon the willingness of a court to declare 
that the thing or object which resulted in the damage to the plaintiff is capable of falling 
within Blackburn J. 's category of "dangerous things" , things likely to cause mischief if 
they escape. 
Note that foreseeability has never been extended to the likelihood of the escape in determining 
liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. Nor has the gravity of the risk involved has ever 
been a relevant consideration under the rule. 
Above n 11, 176. 
[1939) 3 All ER 253. 
Above n 90, 256. 
"That a thing is 'dangerous' simply means that it is generally accepted as having the potential to 
cause damage." As per Salmond and Heuston on Torts, above n 86, 324. Trindale & Cane, 
above n 14, view foreseeability (that the thing would be likely to do damage on escape) as a 
minimal requirement. See also Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zeauuui (Law Book Co Ltd, 
North Ryde, New South Wales, 1991). 
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Similar confusion has been evident in the case law. In West v Bristol 
Tramways91 (a case cited before the House of Lords in Cambridge Water) foreseeability 
of harm appears to have been considered largely irrelevant in determining liability under 
the rule in Rylands v F/,etcher. In that case creosoted wooden blocks, laid by the 
defendant between the rails of their tram.line, released fumes resulting in damage to the 
plai.ntiff s plants in his adjoining nursety gar:den. The defendants were found to have had 
no knowledge of the possibility of such damage and evidence showed that such mischief 
was unknown despite several years of use of this type of creosoted wood. In the 
Divisional Court, Phillimore J held that it is no justification for the defendant to claim that 
"he did not know, or even that there was no reason why he should know, that the injury 
would be caused."98 However the jury had already determined that creosote was a 
dangerous thing although on what grounds we are not told. If, as seems likely, 
foreseeability of harm plays some role in the determining whether something is a 
"dangerous thing" then Phillimore J's comments could only relate to knowledge, or 
means of knowledge, of the way in which the harm occurred. Creosote itself may be a 
dangerous thing because it is foreseeable that, on escape, it may damage plants and 
shrubs. What the evidence apparently showed was not that creosote was not known to 
cause this type of harm, but rather that an escape of creosote from these wooden blocks 
had not occurred in the several years that they had been in use. The defendants are 
effectively in exactly the same position as John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks found 
themselves in 42 years earlier. Thus the finding of liability in this case can be seen as 
entirely compatible with the judgment of Blackburn J in Rylands v F/,etcher. The 
foreseeability of the type of harm having been established by the jury, Phillirnore J was 
simply confirming that the defendants will be liable for that harm no matter how it is 
caused (subject to the defences of Act of God and viz major). 
Nor do the judgments of the Court of Appeal in West v Bristol Tramways negate 
the existence of a foreseeability element in Rylands v F/,etcher liability. Lord Alverstone 
CJ is concerned to negate counsel for the defendant's proposition that the defendant "is 
not liable unless the plaintiff shews that the thing introduced on to the land was, to the 
knowledge of the defendant, likely to escape and cause damage."9 9 This part of his 
decision says no more than that foreseeability of the escape (ie the way in which the harm 
occurred) is not a prerequisite to liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. This 
would be enough to dispose of this issue but Lord Alverstone CJ goes on and, with 
respect, becomes somewhat confused. In complete contradiction to the rule as 
97 
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fonnulated by Blackburn J and Lord Cairns, Lord Alverstone CJ states that it is a defence 
for the defendant to show that the thing brought on to the land was "according to the 
common experience of mank:ind ... not...dangerous, or likely to cause mischief." 100 Thus 
while Blackburn J would impose liability only for things "likely to do mischief" (ie 
"dangerous things"), Lord Alverstone CJ is prepared to impose liability for all things 
unless the defendant can prove that the thing in question is not likely to do mischief. His 
Honour appears to have forgotten that the jury had already determined that creosote was a 
dangerous thing and thus a thing likely to do mischief. This is illustrated by his statement 
that "there was no evidence in this case, that, according to the common experience of 
mankind creosote was not likely to cause mischief."101 The jury having already 
detennined this question such evidence would be irrelevant at the appellate stage. 
Megaw 1J in Leakey v National Trust102 expressed similar sentiments to those of 
Phillimore Jin West v Bristol Tramways when he said: 103 
In Ryl.aruls v Fletcher the defendant was held to be liable because he had erected or 
brought on his land something of an unusual nature, which was essentially dangerous in 
itself. That, said Wright J in Noble v Harrison [[1926] 2 KB 332,342], 'expresses the 
true principle of Ryl.aruls v Fletcher'. The decision in that case was that, on such facts 
there was strict liability. It would be no answer for the defendant to say 'I did not know 
of the danger and had no reason to know of it' . 
This must be correct In Rylands v Fletcher, Rylands and Horrocks were held to be 
liable despite the fact that they did not know of the existence of the mine shafts 
communicating with Fletcher's mine, nor did they have any reason to know of them. 
The body of water in Rylands v Fletcher was a "dangerous thing" (to use the modern 
tenninology) because it was foreseeable that, on escape, it might do mischief. 
Knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of the way in which the water might escape 
played no role in detennining liability. This is a fundamental part of the decision in 
Rylands v Fletcher. Thus Megaw Ll's comments need not be seen as negating a role for 
foreseeability in Rylands v Fletcher liability. 
In addition to West v Bristol Tramways, counsel for the plaintiff in Cambridge 
Water relied on the case of Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano 
100 Above n 97, 21. 
101 Above n 97, 21. 
102 (1980] l All ER 17. 
103 Above n 102, 30. 
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Co 104 to show that foreseeability has no role in Rylands v Fletcher liability. In that case 
the plaintiff's property was damaged by an explosion in an explosives factory. The 
explosion had resulted from the storage of large quantities of dinitrophenol (DNP) close 
to other inflammable materials. The issue before the courts was whether the directors of 
the company could be held liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher notwithstanding 
that there was some question of their knowledge of the storage and characteristics of the 
DNP. The essence of the decision was that persons responsible for the bringing of 
dangerous substances upon their land may be liable whether or not they were aware of 
the danger at the time. 105 This, in itself, does not negate the existence of a foreseeability 
element in Rylands v fletcher. Rather it simply means that where a defendant has 
brought a dangerous thing on to his or her land, s/he will be liable for damage consequent 
on escape and it will be no defence to say, "I personally did not know that it was a 
dangerous thing." It was apparently admitted before the trial judge that the person in 
possession of the DNP was liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. This admission 
effectively designates DNP as a "dangerous thing" in these circumstances Uust as water 
was a "thing likely to do mischief" in the circumstances of Rylands v Fletcher). Concern 
has therefore centred upon Younger U's comments that DNP "was not regarded by 
chemists as really, if at all, dangerous",106 that it "was never known to have 
exploded", 107 and that there is "no real risk" in the storage of DNP.108 However, these 
comments are countered by statements made by other members of the Court of Appeal. 
Lord Stemdale MR, for example, states that "the evidence shows in my opinion that the 
chemists were of the opinion that it [DNP] was not free from danger." 109 Atkin LJ was 
in no doubt that DNP was known to be dangerous. 110 In the House of Lords, Lord 
Sumner was of the opinion that DNP was a dangerous explosive when stored in large 
quantities111 and Lord Parmoor considered that while DNP was not itself dangerous, the 
circumstances in which it was stored in this case made it dangerous. 112 Thus the 
decisions in this case cannot be said to support, with any great weight, a contention that 
foreseeability is not an element of Rylands v Fletcher liability . 
104 
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More problematic, from this point of view, is Bankes LJ's judgment in Musgrove 
v Pandelis, 1 1 3 a case involving the escape of fire which had started in the carburettor of a 
car in the defendant's garage. Bankes LJ was of the opinion that "the expectation of 
danger is not the basis of the principle of Rylands v Fletcher. A thing may be dangerous 
although the danger is unexpected. "1 14 He then goes on to agree with the trial judge that 
the motor car was dangerous within that principle but does not explain why this is so. 
Duke LJ, however, does outline the factors making the car a dangerous thing: 1 15 
Taking together the presence of the petrol, and the production of the inflammable gas, 
or those combustibles together with the inexperience of the person placed in charge of 
them, it is impossible to say that this is not an instance of the principle laid down by 
Blackburn J. 
These are clearly factors related to the foreseeability of fire, that is the type of harm which 
occurred. The mere presence of petrol in the fuel tank of a car is enough to make fire a 
foreseeable risk because it is entirely foreseeable that petrol might catch alight Uust as the 
presence of oil in the Wagon Mound (No 2) was enough to make fire a foreseeable risk). 
In light of this, what is it that Bankes Ll intended by his statement that a thing may be 
dangerous even if the danger is unexpected? If he meant that foreseeability plays no part 
in the determination then it is difficult to reconcile his judgment with that of Duke Ll who 
purported to agree with him. Similarly this meaning cannot be reconciled with Blackburn 
J's "thing likely to do mischief' on escape. However, this is not the only possible 
interpretation of Bankes LJ's comment. His statement was made in response to a 
contention by counsel for the applicant that "a motor car is not a dangerous thing unless it 
is in such a condition that an accident is to be apprehended. "116 What counsel appears to 
be saying is that it is not enough for the car to have a full tank of petrol thus making fire a 
foreseeable type of harm, it must also be foreseeable that the risk would be realised. But 
this was not the law in relation to Rylands v Fletcher liability at the time of this case. It 
had always been enough to demonstrate that the type of harm was foreseeable; 
foreseeability of the escape itself was irrelevant. 11 7 The only question to be asked was 
113 
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whether a thing was likely to do mischief on escape, not whether the thing was likely to 
escape and do mischief. 118 As Eeklaar points out, L 19 where the elements of "dangerous 
thing" and ''non-natural user" are satisfied by the bringing and collecting of something on 
a property, the occupier will be liable for damage caused on escape whether or not the 
defendant "knew or ought to have known, of factors making the escape probable and 
whether or not they did take or could have taken precautions to prevent it." 120 It may be 
that this is the distinction that Bankes U was attempting to emphasise rather than 
eschewing foreseeability per seas the determinant of "dangerous thing". In this way the 
judgments of Bankes and Duke UJ may be reconciled. 
The 1878 case of Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board1 21 provides further 
evidence of foreseeability's role under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. This case involved 
the poisoning of the plaintiffs horse by its having fed upon the leaves of the defendants' 
yew tree. In the course of his judgment Kelly CB made specific reference to the level of 
knowledge required under the rule: 122 
118 
119 
[20 
12 l 
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It does not appear from the case what evidence was given in the county court to prove, 
either that the defendants knew that yew trees were poisonous to cattle, or that the fact 
was common knowledge amongst persons who have to do with cattle. As to the 
defendants' knowledge it would be immaterial, as whether they knew it or not they must 
be held liable for the natural consequences of their own act. It is, however, distinctly 
found by the judge "that cattle frequently browse on the leaves and branches of yew trees 
when within reach, and not unfrequently [sic] are poisoned thereby is a fact generally 
known;" and by this finding, which certainly is in accordance with experience, we are 
bound . 
unnecessary ingredient for liability." As per D Carroll "The Rule in Ryl.a11ds v Fletcher : A Re-
assessment" (1973) 8 frish Jurist 208, 223. 
Thus in Balfourv Barry-King [1956] l WLR 779,791 Havers J determined that a blowlamp was 
within the ambit of Rylands v Fletcher "things" because "it was likely to do mischief if the 
dangerous element in it, that is to say, the fire, escaped." No analysis of the likelihood of escape 
was required. 
JM Eeklaar "Nuisance and Strict Liability" (1973) 8 Irish Jurist 191. 
Above n 119, 205. 
(1878) 4 Ex D 5. 
Above n 121, 11-12. 
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Thus whether the defendants did in fact foresee that the damage might occur was 
irrelevant, but whether such damage was within common knowledge (and therefore 
foreseeable) was central to the finding of liability. 
Foreseeability thus appears to have played a role in determining liability under the 
rule in Rylands v F/etcher since the beginning. Further support for this contention comes 
in the judgment of Windeyer J in the Australian High Court in the case of Benning v 
Wong. 123 His honour sees the foundation of the rule in Rylands v F/etcher as being 
"that the bringing of things with mischievous possibilities or propensities upon land 
creates a duty to confine them there. "124 Windeyer J then noted that the Privy Council in 
Wagon Mound (No 2) held foreseeability of harm to be an element of nuisance and went 
on to say: 125 
In a Rylands v Fletcher case that requirement is, I consider, satisfied if, in the particular 
circumstances, the defendant ought reasonably to have been aware that the thing he had 
accumulated on his land was likely to do harm if it should escape. 
Again there is no requirement that the escape should, in anyway, be foreseeable. 
Foreseeability goes only to the harm that would be consequent on escape. 
D Is the Concept of Foreseeability as Part of the Original Formulation of the Rule in 
Rylands v Fletcher Compatible with the Rule's Nuisance Origins? 
An analysis such as Lord Goffs which, on the one hand, acknowledges Rylands 
v F/etchers nuisance origins and, on the other, establishes that foreseeability had been an 
element of the rule since its inception initially gives rise to a certain degree of conceptual 
difficulty. The problem stems from the idea that at the time Rylands v Fletcher was 
decided (and indeed until the decision in the Wagon Mound (No 2)) nuisance was a strict 
liability tort and as such foreseeability played no part. Although apparently never 
authoritatively stated in any case, it was assumed by many that this was the position. The 
concept of foreseeability in a strict liability tort was regarded as an oxymoron. 
Foreseeability is an element of fault theory and to many strict liability based upon fault 
was not strict liability at all. This attitude, it is submitted, rests on too narrow a concept 
of strict liability. Liability may remain strict although it extends only to foreseeable 
injury. It exists in that no amount of care will absolve a defendant of liability. To say 
123 
124 
125 
Above n 22. 
Above n 22, 298. 
Above n 22, 320. 
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that liability resting on foreseeability cannot be strict is to ignore the most important 
difference between strict liability and negligence - the abihty to avoid liability by the 
taking of reasonable care. 126 As Dias says: 127 
The root difference between negligence and strict liability is that negligence presupposes 
unreasonable (careless) behaviour in the face of the foreseeable likelihood that the harm 
would occur, while strict liability does not rest on foreseeability that the event in 
question was likely to happen. This is why in strict liability situations a defendant is 
liable no matter how reasonably he may have acted. 
It is accepted that the cattle trespass cases are examples of strict liability128 and yet 
foreseeability has long played a role in such cases. As Blackbum J pointed out in 
Fletcherv Rylands: 129 
The case that has most commonly occtUTed, and which is most frequently to be found in 
the books, is as to the obligation of the owner of cattle which he has brought on his 
land, to prevent their escaping and doing mischief. The law as to them seems to be 
perfectly settled from early times; the owner must keep them in at his peril, or he will 
be answernble for the natural consequences of their escape; that is with regard to tame 
beasts, for the grass that they eat and trample upon, though not for any injury to the 
person of others, for our ancestors have settled that it is not the general nature of horses 
to kick, or bulls to gore; but if the owner knows that the beast has a vicious propensity 
to attack man, he will be answerable for that too. 
In more conventional language this amounts to saying that liability does not extend 
beyond foreseeable damage. 130 Despite this cattle trespass is accepted as being a form of 
strict liability closely analogous to the rule in Rylands v F/,etcher. 
Blackburn J had no doubts that the rule that he was applying was one of strict 
liability and yet he expressly referred to the foreseeability involved in cattle trespass and 
to the requirement of a thing "likely to do mischief on escape". 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
"The whole point of Rylands v Fletcher liability is that the exercise of care is irrelevant"; as per 
Menzies J in Benning v Wong, above n 22, 278. 
Dias "Trouble on oiled waters: Problems of the Wagon Mound (No 2)" (1967) 25 CU 62. 
Dias, above n 6; Fleming, above n 6; Winfield, above n 23; Todd, above n 92. 
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It is submitted that foreseeability is not incompatible with the concept of strict 
liability. Further, while the Wagon Mound (No 2) addressed the issue of foreseeability 
in nuisance directly for the first time, in fact the finding that foreseeability is an element of 
nuisance is not incompatible with earlier authority. In the 1839 case of Chadwick v 
Trower131 the question before the Exchequer Chamber was whether the law imposes a 
duty upon a defendant, when pulling down a wall on his or her property, to avoid 
damaging an adjoining vault on the neighbouring property, the existence of which the 
defendant was unaware. Although the language of Parke B is somewhat unclear, the 
case has subsequently been considered to have been decided on the basis of nuisance. 132 
The Court in Chadwick v Trower were unanimously of the opinion that even supposing 
that there was a duty on the defendant not to injure the plaintiffs vault when the 
defendant is cognisant of the vault's existence, "no such obligation can arise where there 
is no avennent that the defendant had notice of its existence". 13 3 The defendant was not 
liable for the damage to the plaintiffs vault because he was unaware of the vault's 
existence. In other words, the damage which occurred was unforeseeable. 
Almost all nuisance cases prior to the Wagon Mound (No 2) fail to consider the 
issue of foreseeability but it appears that none are inconsistent with its application to 
nuisance. There seems to have been no binding authority where liability in nuisance was 
found in respect of damage that could be said to be completely unforeseeable. 134 
VI li'ORESEEABILITY'S ROLE IN CAMBRIDGE WATER 
In Cambridge Water Lord Goff can be seen to be continuing the common law 
trend by applying a concept of foreseeability of the the type of harm to Rylands v 
Fletcher liability: 13 5 
131 
13'.! 
133 
134 
135 
[IJt appears to me to be appropriate now to take the view that foreseeability of damage 
of the relevant type should be regarded as a prerequisite of liability in damages under the 
rnle. 
(1839) 133 ER I. 
See Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 AC 740, 746; Jlford Urban District Council v &al and Judd 
L19251 I KB 671. 
Above n 131, 5. 
Winfield, above n 23, 384. 
Above n I, 76. 
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However, it is his application of this foreseeability requirement to the facts of the case 
before him which must be assessed to determine the precise role he allocated to 
foreseeability. 
Early in his judgment Lord Goff isolates four factors which he saw as being of 
particular relevance and it is on the basis of these that he decided the case:136 
(1) The spillage of the solvent and its seepage into the ground beneath the floor of the 
tannery occurred during the period which ended in 1976 as a result of regular spillages of 
small quantities of the solvent onto the tannery's floor. 
(2) The escape of dissolved solvent from the pools of neat solvent which collected at or 
towards the base of the chalk aquifers beneath the tannery into the chalk aquifers under 
the adjoining land and thence in the direction of the defendant's bore hole must have 
begun at some unspecified date well before 1976 and be still continuing to the present 
day. 
(3) As held by the Judge, the seepage of the solvent beneath the floor of the tannery 
down into the chalk aquifers below was not foreseeable by a reasonable supervisor 
employed by the tannery, nor was it foreseeable by him that detectable quantities of the 
solvent would be found down-catchment, so that he could not have foreseen, in or before 
1976, that the repeated spillages would lead to any environmental hazard or damage. The 
only foreseeable damage from spillage of the solvent was that somebody might be 
overcome by fumes from a substantial spillage of the solvent on the surface of the 
ground. 
(4) The water so contaminated at the bore hole has never been held to be dangerous to 
health. But under criteria laid down in the UK Regulations, issued in response to the 
EEC Directive, the water so contaminated was not 'wholesome' and, since 1985, could 
not lawfully be supplied in this country as drinking water. 
The third factor appears to go further than required and incorporates facts that were, at 
least prior to Carnhridge Water, irrelevant to liability under the rule in Rylaruis v Fletcher. 
The fact that seepage of the PCE through ECL's concrete floor and into the chalk aquifer 
and its consequent movement down-catchment was unforeseeable is irrelevant These 
facts simply tell us that the escape itself was unforeseeable and foreseeability of escape 
has never been an element of the rule in Rylaruis v Fletcher. The traditional inquiry has 
136 Above n 1, 66. 
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always assumed escape, the actual likelihood of the escape being irrelevant The question 
to be addressed is whether, on escape, harm of the type which occurred was foreseeable. 
In viewing the foreseeability of seepage and down-catchment movement as relevant, Lord 
Goff appears to be asking a very different question: was it foreseeable that the PCE 
would escape and cause this type of damage? He fails to separate the escape from the 
damage. While on the facts of Cambridge Water the two are, for practical purposes, 
inextricably linked, for the purposes of the foreseeability inquiry only the type of damage 
is relevant. Lord Goff seems to be requiring foreseeability of both the type of harm that 
occurred and the way in which it happened to establish liability under the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher. This would clearly be inconsistent with the previously accepted common law 
position as outlined in this paper. However, it may be that Lord Goff's judgment can be 
read in a manner more consonant with established common law. 
The type of damage at issue in this case is contamination of drinking water by 
PCE. The escape of PCE occurred during the period ending 1976. However, on the 
facts before the court, PCE appears not to have been regarded as a contaminant of 
drinking water until 1980 when the Council of the European Communities issued a 
directive relating to the quality of water intended for human consumption. Thus it is 
impossible, at the time of the escapes, to say that contamination of drinking water was a 
reasonably foreseeable type of harm that might result from the escape of PCE. The only 
type of damage foreseeable from the escape of PCE was, at the time, that someone would 
be overcome by fumes. L 3 7 As such there could be no liability under the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher because the harm in issue was unforeseeable. 
Thus there are two possible interpretations of the decision in Cambridge Water. 
On the first, the foreseeability element of the rule was not established because the course 
of events leading to the damage was not reasonably foreseeable. On the second, the 
foreseeability element was not satisfied because it was only after the event that what 
occurred came to be regarded as damage. The former would be a development in the 
doctrine of Rylands v Fletcher, the latter merely a confirmation of what appears, on this 
writer's analysis, to have been existing common law. 
There is no express indication in Lord Goff s judgment as to which of the two 
approaches he is taking. His reliance on the facts above suggests that he was requiring 
foreseeability of both the type of harm and the way in which it occurred. However, a 
comment late in his judgment could be seen to indicate otherwise: L 38 
137 
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Above n l, 64. 
Above n l, 77. 
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[Wlhen ECL created the conditions which have ultimately led to the present state of 
affairs - whether by bringing the PCE in question onto its land, or by retaining it there, 
or by using it in its tanning process - it could not possibly have foreseen that damage of 
the type now complained of might be caused thereby. fndeed, long before the relevant 
legislation came into force, the PCE had become irretrievably lost in the ground below. 
29 
A Which Analysis is Preferable? 
Clearly an analysis which rests easily with over 100 years of consistently applied 
precedent is to be preferred to one which would appear, without providing any 
justification, to ignore established law. Further, the consequences of adopting an 
approach extending foreseeability to escape mitigate against such an approach. Requiring 
foreseeability of escape in order to establish liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
extends the role of the foreseeability inquiry well beyond that in nuisance. On this 
analysis it would be possible to avoid liability for a "dangerous thing" on your land by 
storing it in a way which makes escape unforeseeable. This brings the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher very close to negligence. Liability could be avoided under the rule by the 
exercise of care. Strict liability would remain only where care was not taken to render 
escape unforeseeable or where the "thing" could not be stored in a manner that made 
escape unforeseeable. 
Such an approach may illustrate negligence's "unstoppable tendency to subsume 
under its heading the role of older nominate torts",139 but it goes further than the House 
of Lords appear to have intended. Lord Goff was concerned to bring Rylands v Fletcher 
into line with twentieth century concepts of nuisance. He does not appear to have 
intended that Rylands v Fletcher liability be subsumed by negligence. 
VII CONCLUSION 
Although foreseeability appears to have been a part of the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher since the rule's inception, until Cambridge Water the courts avoided direct 
consideration of its scope or even its existence. Fleming regards the Wagon Mound (No 
2) as representing "[a]nother important step .. .in consolidating the fault element in the 
modern law of nuisance with the persuasive theory of negligence." 140 It seems that the 
same can be said of the decision in Cambridge Water with respect to the rule in Rylands v 
139 
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Markesinis "Negligence, nuisance and affirmative duties of action" (1989) 105 LQR 104, 104. 
Fleming, above n 6, 444. 
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Fletcher. Both decisions reflect more openness to the idea of fault in strict liability and 
both can be seen as judicial recognition of existing fault elements in strict liability torts. 
It has been said that this decision spells the end of Rylarul.s v Fletcher's useful life 
as an independent cause of action. 141 Now that foreseeability has been recognised as an 
element of the rule in Rylaruls v Fletcher nuisance will provide a remedy in all cases in 
which Rylaruls v Fletcher is applicable. The acknowledgement of foreseeability's role in 
Rylaruls v Fletcher liability removes the perceived advantage that the rule held over 
nuisance. Today it can clearly be seen that there is no advantage to a plaintiff in choosing 
Rylaruls v Fletcher, rather than private nuisance, to ground an action for escape in the 
course of a non-natural use. Lord Goff states that Rylaruls v Fletcher should be regarded 
"essentially as an extension of the law of nuisance to cases of isolated escape"14 '2 but it is 
clear that today nuisance itself extends to isolated escapes. 143 Nuisance is the broader 
tort and as such it may be that Rylaruls v Fletchers days are numbered. What is clear, 
for the first time since 1866, is that strict liability in tort rests squarely upon fault. 
141 
142 
143 
Pardy "Requiem for Rylands v Fletcher: Cambridge Water v Eastern Counties Leather" (1994) 
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